Interest Groups in the Teaching of Legal History by Hovenkamp, Herbert J.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
11-20-2014 
Interest Groups in the Teaching of Legal History 
Herbert J. Hovenkamp 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Economic History Commons, Inequality and 
Stratification Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Education 
Commons, Legal History Commons, Legislation Commons, Other Anthropology Commons, Public 
Economics Commons, and the Religion Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "Interest Groups in the Teaching of Legal History" (2014). Faculty Scholarship at 
Penn Law. 1828. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1828 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368246 
Hovenkamp Teaching Legal History Dec. 2013, Page 1 
 
Interest Groups in the Teaching of Legal History 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
 One reason legal history is more interesting than it was several decades ago 
is the increased role of interest groups in our accounts of legal change.  Diverse 
movements including law and society, critical legal theory, comparative law, and 
public choice theory have promoted this development, even among writers who 
are not predominantly historians.  Individually, historians such as Charles Beard,  
J. Willard Hurst, Lawrence M. Friedman, Morton J. Horwitz, and William E. Nelson 
are among the many who have recast legal development under democracy as a 
consequence of disputes and compromises among diverse social and economic 
interests. 
 Clearly, legal historians must acknowledge the importance of interest group 
interaction in causing legal change.  Nonetheless, in my own survey course in 
American legal I often push back.  Taken too far, interest group theorizing 
becomes an easy shortcut for assessing legal movements and developments 
without fully understanding the ideas behind them.  To be sure, intellectual 
history in the United States went into decline because its practitioners often 
wrote as if the history of ideas drove everything else, either disregarding or 
minimizing the role of interest groups.  In the process intellectual history became 
branded as belligerently conservative because the dissemination of ideas in our 
past was controlled by a relatively small number of elites.  These were mainly 
white, privileged, well educated, and male,.  Great works of intellectual history, 
such as Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in American Thought (1944), 
contain virtually no women, and Afro-Americans only as the objects of study 
rather than as participants.   Social history became an essential corrective for 
including those that the history of ideas ignored. 
 Intellectual history was never inherently conservative in this fashion, 
however.  People other than the white, male, upper classes have always 
contributed powerful ideas to political and legal dialogue.  The dominant group of 
intellectual historians writing at the mid-twentieth century (Hofstadter, Henry 
Steele Commager, Morton White) either ignored them as serious contributors of 
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influential ideas or else regarded their ideas as derivative.  That was not true of 
everyone.  For example Perry Miller was deeply conservative about history and 
believed strongly that political and legal outcomes are controlled by ideas.  
Nevertheless, he also wrote with admiration about such dissenters as Roger 
Williams and Anne Hutchinson, taking seriously both their ideas as well as those 
of their critics.  Nevertheless, conservative bias left a stigma on intellectual history 
from which it has really never recovered. 
 On the other side, social and economic history have been driven by 
impulses originating from both the left (Marxism and its variants) and the right 
(public choice theory) that  view policy as little more than the outcome of conflict 
among interest groups.  Further, these preference are generally "naked" in the 
sense that they reveal little more than the desires of each individual for wealth, 
stability, social status, or other recognition.  Articulated ideas are little more than 
rationalizations, and the public processes that make legal rules are largely a zero 
sum game. 
 I try to instill in my students the idea that legal history is a much more 
complex process in which ideas and preferences interact.  In differing areas and at 
different times one may dominate over the other, but almost never permanently.  
Further, ideas lead to preferences just as much as the other way around. 
 For example, when I get to the subject of business regulation I present my 
students with an issue such as this:  in virtually every American state public 
utilities such as water, municipal gas and later electricity developed historically in 
a regulated “natural monopoly” regime in which the companies were publicly 
owned or price regulated to guarantee them a profitable rate of return.   In the 
nineteenth century the price administration was often part of a firm's charter; 
later it came through bureaus and agencies.  But it was nonetheless there.  As a 
result, public utilities almost always made money and bankruptcies were rare.  By 
contrast, groceries and lumber were sold in competitive markets, where prices 
were set by each firm acting in competition with other firms and business 
turnover was high, particularly in bad economic times.  What accounts for these 
important differences in the legal structure of these industries?  Is it because the 
utilities had more effective lobbyists or other interest group organizing than the 
grocers did?  Almost certainly not.  Over history small business and particularly 
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retailers have been quite successful at interest group politics.  I don’t believe the 
answer has much to do with interest groups at all.  The dominant fact is that by 
the mid-nineteenth century economics had developed a very robust doctrine of 
natural monopoly, limited to public utilities and a few other markets, that 
recommended regulated monopoly in those cases but not others.  The strength of 
that set of ideas served to consolidate political and legal opinion.  To be sure, 
retailing in the United States has flirted with periods of regulation and 
protectionist legislation, but the views supporting these never claimed anything 
like the same level of consensus.  The difference in the legal status of gas 
companies and grocers is much more robustly explained by a theory of political 
economy than by any story about interest group conflict. 
 We do our legal history students a disservice when we explain everything 
about legal regulation of the economy in interest group terms.  In order to have a 
satisfactory answer one must also understand something about the technological, 
environmental, or engineering aspects of markets.  For example, when long 
distance telephone communication required a physical line between speakers the 
United States phone was a monopoly controlled by AT&T.  When wireless 
communication became commercially feasible, a competitive market structure 
emerged.  Focusing on either the technological issues or the political issues to the 
exclusion of the other distorts the legal history of regulation, which expanded 
aggressively during the period 1900-1970, and the deregulation that occurred 
thereafter. 
 When theory is robust the relative weight of interest groups tends to be 
diminished.  By contrast, when theory is chaotic, widely disputed, or has a poor fit 
with relevant facts, then interest groups play a much larger role.  This explains, for 
example, why the role of interest groups has been much more significant in the 
development of an area such as intellectual property law (patents and copyright) 
than in other areas of economic regulation.  Notwithstanding centuries of debate, 
there is little economic or technical consensus about fundamental questions such 
as the public value of the patent system or the optimal length or scope of a 
patent or copyright.  Lacking decisive theory, Congress listens more closely to 
interest groups, and in this particular case the best organized interest groups are 
producers.  The result is that small businesses and consumer groups have 
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traditionally paid (in both higher prices and reduced innovation) for overly 
protective intellectual property systems. 
 The treatment of social history, race relations, gender and other 
discrimination policy is more difficult, particularly in the twentieth century.   
Consensus was more elusive.  I focus my own lectures on Darwin, the social 
sciences, and the nature-nurture controversy.  The legal issues include social 
exclusion and residential and education segregation, interracial marriage, 
sterilization and eugenics.  Darwin is particularly interesting, not only because of 
the way that it divided populations but also because so many legal ideas were 
attributed to it, including some that did not belong there.  (For example, 
substantive due process was driven entirely by economics and had little to do 
with Social Darwinism).   Darwinism itself produced strong right-leaning 
antigovernment views (Social Darwinism) and left-leaning views favoring a strong 
regulatory and welfare State (Reform Darwinism and Progressivism).  For most of 
its history until 1930 or so both sides were vehemently racist, even though they 
had very different ideas about the role of government.  Indeed, the State 
managed racism of the Progressives was undoubtedly more harmful to racial 
minotirities than the more passive and private racism that preceded it. 
 Through all of this I try to instill in my students the idea that these people 
took their own scientific views just as seriously as we take ours today.  They 
probably had about as much certainty that they were right, and no less reason for 
thinking so. 
 Interest group theory generally provides a more powerful explanation for 
legal change in twentieth century America than earlier.  As intellectual consensus 
broke down interest groups acquired a relatively greater role.  Nothing in the 
twentieth century dominated American policy thought as much as Protestant 
orthodoxy and classical political economy dominated the earlier period.  Of 
course, this itself is an interest group driven phenomenon.  The participation of 
women and racial minorities in the making of theology and political economy was 
small to nearly nonexistent.  At the same time, however, the great Victorian ideas 
that shattered this world view, from Biblical criticism to Darwin to the marginalist 
revolution in economics were dominated by white males as well.  Nevertheless, as 
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intellectual consensus became less prominent, a greater range of interest groups 
became relevant and eventually significant. 
 Teaching legal history in this fashion is more challenging to both the 
instructor and the students because it requires that ideas be taken more 
seriously.  One cannot simply pass a hand over an entire area such as business 
policy and proclaim it to be the result of Social Darwinism, populism, labor and 
the surge in immigration, or some other interest group movement.  I certainly do 
not expect my students to become experts in Calvinism, the social contract, 
classical political economy, genetic determinism, Freud, or the many other areas 
that wander into and out of my legal history course.  But I do expect them to learn 
enough to take them seriously, and to understand that these intellectual ideas 
were as powerful to those who encountered them as the ideas that we hold 
today.  Further the relative weight to be given to interest groups and political 
interests must be continuously re-examined.  
  
 
 
